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Introduction
Why do security prices change? What is the amount of price-relevant information contained in a trade event? And in which way is the phenomenon that the time intervals between trade events exhibit idiosyncratic patterns associated with information processing? The availability of financial markets transaction level data allows to address those questions. Valid answers are interesting for both academia and decision making of investors and designers of trading venues. It is thus not surprising that a vast literature has evolved, theoretical and empirical, in which these questions are addressed. Bringing together the empirical microstructure literature originating in the seminal papers by Hasbrouck (1991a,b) who introduced vector autoregressive models (VARs) in microstructure, and recent contributions to modeling the properties of financial duration processes (Engle and Russell (1998) , Engle (2000) ), Dufour and Engle (2000) investigate the role of time varying transaction intensities in measuring the informational content of trades. Their paper made a strong point for the "no trade means no information" prediction derived from Easley and O'Hara's (1992) microstructure model. This paper revisits the role of time in measuring the price impact of trades using a structural framework and provides challenging new evidence. Instead of employing an agnostic VAR, we extend Madhavan et al.'s (1997) seminal model (MRR) to account for time varying trading intensities. To model the duration process we combine the MRR model and Engle and Russell's (1999) ACD framework. We estimate both the Dufour/Engle VAR and the extended MRR model for a cross section of stocks traded on one of the largest Continental European Markets and also, for robustness checks, on NYSE data. The results challenge the "no trade means no information" interpretation. Rather, our analysis corroborates predictions from strategic trading models put forth by Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999) , in which short durations between trades are not related to the processing of private information. This paper connects to various streams in the literature which investigate the role of time in the trading process. The empirical analysis provides an empirical test of the predictions of theoretical microstructure models involving the role of time in the trading process. Due to their different inherent assumptions, these models deliver conflicting predictions. For instance, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict that in the case of short sale constraints long intervals of trade inactivity are evidence for bad news. On the other hand, in absence of such restraints, the model put forth by Easley and O'Hara (1992) implies that long no-trade 2 intervals indicate that there is no new information. In their model, informed traders split up their orders in smaller chunks in order to disguise their trading motive. The order splitting strategy increases trading intensity, and leads to shorter durations between trades which then tend to be more informative w.r.t. the evolution of the asset price. Another classic reference is Admati/Pfleiderer (1988) . In their model, non-informed liquidity traders cluster during periods of the trading day. This implies that high trading intensity would be associated with less informed trading. Although traders with private information may hide in the crowd of liquidity traders, the price impact of their trades is "cushioned" by the trading of the uninformed liquidity traders. Recent strategic trading models (Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999) ) provide more elaborate explanations for such a clustering process. In Parlour's (1998) model, large depth on the bid side increases buyer "aggressiveness", in other words: more buy market orders, more (buyer initiated) trading activity. The reasoning is symmetric for the sell side. Arguably, periods of high liquidity (measured as the depth at the best quotes) in limit order markets are associated with a lesser degree of private or public information in the market. Specifically, patient limit order traders, who are not trading for reasons of exploiting their superior information, and who are not afraid of being "picked off" by an informed order or adverse price movement, will supply ample liquidity. Thus, high liquidity in the order book emerges during non-informative periods. As liquidity traders gather together (via limit order submission, they supply liquidity) during non-informative periods, trading becomes more aggressive (more market orders triggering trades) when impatient traders strive to get priority over standing limit orders.
The second stream in the literature to which this paper connects to is the statistical modeling of time varying transaction intensities in financial markets. Engle and Russell's (1998) seminal contribution triggered a growing literature that proposes statistical methodologies to account for the idiosyncratic time series properties of financial duration processes (e.g. Engle (2000) , Zhang, Russell, and Tsay (2001) Bauwens and Giot (2001) , Fernandes and Grammig (2006) ). Dufour and Engle (2000) linked this literature to a classical empirical microstructure methodology introduced by Hasbrouck (1991a Hasbrouck ( , 1991b ) who proposed to measure price impacts of trades via a VAR framework. Hasbrouck's VARs approach does not explicitly take into account the fact that the time between trades and quote updates is varying. The potential information contained in these no-trade intervals is neglected. Dufour and Engle (2000) showed 3 that accounting for the time between trades does matter in measuring trade informativeness in a Hasbrouck-VAR framework. Dufour and Engle (2000) estimate their model on a cross section of stocks using the 1991 TORQ data base. Their study made a strong case for the "no trade means no information" prediction derived from Easley and O'Hara (1992) . They found that trades after short durations have a significantly higher price impact than trades after long durations.
The third stream in the literature with which our contribution is connected, is the class of structural models introduced by Glosten and Harris (1988) , Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) and Huang and Stoll (1997) . In contrast to Hasbrouck's VAR framework, these models contain structural equations for the evolution of the latent asset price which depends on the informational content of trade events. Furthermore, the anticipatory behavior of liquidity suppliers who take into account price impacts of trades (due to informed trading), order processing costs, and possible costs of holding unwanted inventory, is explicitly accounted for. As in Hasbrouck's VAR methodology, however, the information allegedly contained in no-trade intervals is not taken into account. This paper contributes to the literature in the following way. We extend the intensities in a structural model we combine the MRR model with the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model introduced by Engle and Russell (1998) . To our knowledge this paper is the first to provide a link of the structural models of market microstructure to the literature that deals with the modeling of dynamic duration processes. We show how structural parameters and the parameters of the ACD can be conveniently and simultaneously estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We estimate both the Dufour/Engle VAR and our extended MRR model on a cross section of stocks traded on one of the large European Stock markets, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) which is operated as an automated auction market. For a robustness check the model is also estimated on a matched sample of NYSE traded stocks. One advantage of using the FSE data is their excellent quality. Problems that arise from misclassified trades, which can have severe consequences (see Boehmer, Grammig, and Theissen (2006) ), are avoided. Furthermore, as open order book markets become increasingly important, it seems interesting to estimate these 4 models using recent data generated within these market structures.
The main results are as follows. Estimating the extended MRR model on European and NYSE data we find that trades occurring after periods of inactivity (long durations between trades) are more informative than trades during active periods (short durations) a result that is also confirmed for the NYSE control sample. The adverse selection component of the spread is higher for trades after long durations. We also find that adverse selection costs of less actively traded stocks are more severely affected by the time between transactions than more actively traded stocks. These results challenge the "no trade means no information" result of Dufour and Engle (2000) . Rather than supporting the predictions of the Easley and O'Hara (1992) model, our findings are more in accord with the models of strategic trading in limit order markets (Parlour (1998 ), Foucault (1999 ). As noted above, a high trading intensity in those models is caused by the submission of market orders by impatient, yet uninformed traders who strive aggressively for priority for their orders when the liquidity on their own market side is high (small spread, large depth). However, liquidity supply is ample when limit order traders are not afraid of being picked off by an adverse price movement (be it induced by public or private information processing). These results emphasize the relevance of the Admati/Pfleiderer (1988) explanation that through clustering of liquidity-induced trading, short durations between trades are associated with smaller price impact of trades.
Estimating Dufour and Engle's extended Hasbrouck-VAR on our data we broadly confirm their main conclusions. The contradictory results must therefore be attributable to the methodology used to measure the informational content of trade. Investigating this issue in greater detail we conjecture that the differences are caused by the way the econometric methodologies deal with market-to-limit orders which are a quite popular instrument used by traders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used for the analysis and the market structure. The empirical methodology employed in our study is presented in section 3. In section 4 we discuss the empirical results and section 6 concludes.
Market Structure and Data
In our empirical analysis we use data from the automated auction system Xetra which operates at various European trading venues, like the Vienna Stock Exchange, the Irish Stock 5 Exchange, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) and the European Energy Exchange. 1 Specifically, our data are the 30 DAX stocks traded at the FSE in the first quarter, 2004. We also use TAQ data for a matched sample of NYSE traded stocks as a robustness check. Since the NYSE trading process has been outlined in many papers and textbooks (see e.g. Bauwens and Giot (2001) and Harris (2003) for lucid surveys) we refrain from adding another description.
The Xetra trading system, however, warrants some explanations. Xetra is a pure open order book system developed and maintained by the German Stock Exchange. It has operated since 1997 as the main trading platform for German blue chip stocks at the FSE. Since the Xetra/FSE trading protocol is the data generating process for this study we will briefly describe its important features. 2
Between an opening and a closing call auction -and interrupted by another mid-day call auction -Xetra/FSE trading is based on a continuous double auction mechanism with automatic matching of orders based on the usual rules of price and time priority. During pre- In addition to the traditional limit and market orders, traders can submit so-called iceberg (or hidden) orders. An iceberg order is similar to a limit order in that it has pre-specified limit price and volume. The difference is that a portion of the volume is kept hidden from the other traders and is not visible in the open book. Xetra/FSE faces some local, regional and international competition for order flow. The FSE maintains a parallel floor trading system, which bears some similarities with the NYSE, and, like in the US, some regional exchanges participate in the hunt for liquidity. Furthermore, eleven out of the thirty stocks we analyze in our empirical study are also cross listed at the 1 The Xetra technology was recently licensed to the Shanghai Stock Exchange, China's largest stock exchange. 2 The Xetra trading system resembles in many features other important limit order book markets around the world like Euronext, the joint trading platform of the Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris stock exchanges, the Hong Kong stock exchange described in Ahn et al. (2001) , and the Australian stock exchange, described in Cao et al. (2004) . 6 NYSE, as an ADR or, in the case of DaimlerChrysler, as a globally registered share. However, the electronic trading platform clearly dominates the regional and international competitors in terms of market shares, at least for the blue chip stocks that we study in the present paper.
The Frankfurt Stock Exchange granted access to a database containing complete information about Xetra open order book events (entries, cancelations, revisions, expirations, partial-fills and full-fills of market, limit and iceberg orders) which occurred during the first three months of 2004 (January, 2nd -March, 31st). The sample comprises the thirty German blue chip stocks constituting the DAX30 index. Based on the event histories we perform a real time reconstruction of the sequences of best bid and ask prices and associated depths, and record a time stamped series of transactions (with transaction price and volume) initiated by market order or marketable limit order traders. The resulting data are comparable to the Trade and Quote (TAQ) data supplied by the New York Stock Exchange. Contrary to the TAQ data set, we know the correct trade direction identifier and do not have to apply trade classification algorithms, e.g. Lee and Ready (1991) .
insert table 1 about here Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the thirty stocks that constitute the DAX30 index. The table also displays the sorting of the thirty stocks into four groups. The stocks are grouped according to their trading frequency (measured as the average number of trades per day). Group one contains the most frequently traded stocks, while group four the least frequently traded stocks. The table contains the market capitalization, the daily turnover and the average daily number of trades as well as the average midquote price, the quoted spread and the average relative quoted spread.
Empirical Methodology

The Dufour/Engle Approach
Before introducing the structural framework that we use to investigate the role of time and the price impact of trades let us briefly review Dufour and Engle's (2000) extension of Hasbrouck's (1991a,b) bivariate vector autoregressive model. To measure the price impact of trades and the role of duration between trade events, Dufour and Engle set up a VAR that contains two 7 equations, one that accounts for the dynamics of the midquote revision process and one that models the evolution of the direction of trades:
(1)
where 
A Structural Approach
As an alternative to measuring the role of time in measuring the price impact of trades we resort to an alternative class of structural models which are extensively used in market 8 microstructure. The most popular examples are the models proposed by Glosten and Harris (1988) , Madhavan et al (1997) and Huang and Stoll (1997) . These models consist of structural equations for the evolution of the fundamental asset value and the behavior of liquidity suppliers (market makers or limit order traders) which post bid and ask quotes anticipating the price impact of trades and demand compensation for involuntary inventory taking and order processing costs. One of the advantages of these models is the clear theoretical background that allows to give the parameter estimates a structural interpretation and allows for an economically meaningful decomposition of the spread. Let us briefly review the basic contents of the Madhavan et al (1997) model that we will extend below to account for a time varying trade intensity.
In the MRR model there are two factors driving the fundamental value of a stock. First, we have the public news factor. The second factor is private information which can be inferred from order flow and consists of the surprise in order flow multiplied with a measure for the degree of asymmetric information. For the post-trade expected value of a stock, µ i , results the following expression:
Contrary to a market with a specialist where some transactions may be executed inside the spread, all buys (sells) with a smaller or equal volume than the best depth are executed at the prevailing best ask (bid) price. Trades inside the spread are not possible. It can easily
where ρ is the first order autocorrelation of the trade indicator series. The equation for the transaction price can be expressed as
where ξ i is an i.i.d mean zero disturbance term which accounts for possible rounding errors due to price discretion. Combining (4) and (7) yields the following equation for transaction price changes
We extend the basic MRR model in the following way. In the spirit of Dufour and Engle (2000) we also allow the log-duration between the last and the current trade to determine the parameter θ(·) which measures the price impact of a trade. Specifically, we write
where t i is the time of event i and T i denotes the duration between the trade in t i−1 and time t i .
As in Dufour and Engle (2000) , we add one second to each duration before taking logarithms in order to avoid negative values. Incorporating a deterministic time of day pattern in the objective function directly instead of estimating the model separately for different periods of the day has the advantage that we can easily check for statistical significance of the estimated parameters λ φ m and λ θ m . Since the price in t − 1 is (8) can now be written as:
Moment conditions can be derived as follows. Denoting u i = ε i + ξ i − ξ i−1 , we can write
Together with a vector of time-of-day dummy variables
, the resulting moment conditions are given by
The first three moment conditions are the same as in the standard MRR model. The next two moment conditions result from the inclusion of the time-of-day dummies and the last one is due to the inclusion of the duration. Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) have argued that the surprise in order flow rather than order flow itself affects the fundamental value of an asset. If order flow is predictable, using raw order flow would imply that the fundamental value µ i depends on information of time t i−2 . Otherwise the fundamental asset value is not a martingale any longer. Engle and Russell (1998) 
where Φ(t i ) is the diurnal pattern of durations and ψ i evolves as
The alternative specification for the trade informativeness parameter θ(·) is then written as:
Two step estimation of the ACD model parameters is feasible by first estimating the intra-day pattern Φ(t i ) with polynomial trigonometric regression (see Eubank and Speckman (1990) ). The seasonally adjusted durations can then be computed asT i = T i /Φ(t i ). In the second step, the parameters of the ψ i equation can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood.
Joint estimation of ACD and structural parameters is also feasible. Grammig and Wellner (2002) show how estimation of ACD model parameters can be performed in a GMM framework. Drawing on their analysis, the moment conditions that estimate the extended MRR 12 model parameters along with the ACD parameters are as follows:
The first set of moment conditions are the same as in equation (13) except that T i is now substituted withν i . The other moment conditions identify the ACD parameters. They make use of the assumption that E(ν i ) = 1 and that the covariance between ν i and ν i−j for all j > i is assumed to be zero. The estimation results confirm some well known stylized facts of financial market microstructure. The adverse selection component is significantly higher in the first half hour of the day, a result that is consistent with previous research studying the intra-day pattern of the spread. Furthermore, the order processing cost component is significantly higher at the end of the day for the vast majority of stocks. This indicates that liquidity providers demand a compensation for holding inventory overnight. The vast majority of the dummy variables for the remaining time periods are not significantly different from the mid-day reference period.
Results
The ∪-shaped pattern of the effective spread in Xetra is therefore due to higher adverse selection costs as well as higher order processing costs in the morning and higher order processing costs shortly before closing. For the purpose of assessing the economic significance of our results, we split the adverse
and a part explained by the duration shock of the subsequent no-trade interval
Both terms constitute the complete adverse selection component,
We can then compute for each stock the adverse selection share of the spread
the adverse selection share of the spread due to duration
, and the share of adverse selection explained by duration to the total adverse selection com-
. Note, that this result is not due to cross section or time-of-day variations of the trade durations. We have argued above that stocks traded less frequently tend to have higher adverse selection costs. To confirm that the upward sloping curve in figure 3 is not an artefact caused by intra-group variation of trading frequency in each trade activity quartile, we provide additional figures for a selected representative stock in each trade activity quartile in figure 4. We find for individual stocks the same relation between duration and adverse selection.
Note that the duration effect can also not be ascribed to co-movements in the intra-daily pattern of the trade duration and the adverse selection component. We have seen in figure   1 that the information induced part of the spread is high in the first half hour and lower for the rest of the day.
insert figure 5 about here Figure 5 shows that trade durations rather have an inverted ∪-shaped intra-day pattern.
At the beginning of the trading day, when adverse selection costs are high, trade durations tend to be short. Hence, we would rather expect a dampening of the positive duration effect through the intra-day variation. Therefore, we conclude that neither intra-group variation in the average trading frequency of the stocks nor the intra-day pattern in the deterministic part of the adverse selection component is responsible for the strong impact of trade durations.
insert figure 6 about here
As a robustness check we also estimate the model for a matched sample of NYSE traded stocks. The matching variable is the daily trading volume. The NYSE stocks included in the matched sample and their Xetra counterparts are reported in Table 6 . Table 7 shows that the conclusions for the Xetra/DAX stocks also hold for the NYSE sample: The adverse selection parameter δ is positive and significant for 22 of the 30 stocks. The plots in figure 6 show the same upward sloping curve that suggests that the informational content of trades is higher after relatively long no-trade periods. However, from an economic point of view, the informational importance of trade durations for the spread seems smaller for the NYSE stocks compared to the Xetra/DAX stocks.
Interpretation and Discussion
The statistical and economic significance of these results challenge the "no trade means no information" result of Dufour and Engle (2000) that is part of financial market microstructure's conventional wisdom. Rather than supporting the predictions of the Easley and O'Hara (1992) model, our findings are more in accord with the models of strategic trading in limit order markets (Parlour (1998 ), Foucault (1999 ). Their contributions relate to a classic paper by Admati/Pfleiderer (1988) . In the Admati/Pfleiderer model non-informed liquidity traders cluster during periods of the trading day which implies that high trading intensity would be associated with reduced trade informativeness. Traders with private information may hide in the crowd of liquidity traders, the price impact of their trades is "cushioned" by the trading of the uninformed liquidity traders. The models by Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999) provide more elaborate explanations for such a clustering process. In Parlour's (1998) model, large depth on the bid side increases buyer "aggressiveness", in other words: more buy market orders, more (buyer initiated) trading activity. The reasoning is symmetric for the sell side. Arguably, periods of high liquidity (measured as the depth at the best quotes) in limit order markets are associated with a lesser degree of private information present in the market. Patient limit order traders, who are not trading for reasons of exploiting their superior information, and who are not afraid of being "picked off" by an informed order or adverse price movement, will then supply ample liquidity. Thus, high liquidity in the order book emerges during non-informative periods. As liquidity traders gather together (via limit order submission, they supply liquidity to the market) during non-informative periods, trading becomes more aggressive (more market orders triggering trades) when impatient (yet not superiorly informed) traders strive to get priority over standing limit orders.
As a matter of fact when estimating the Dufour/Engle model on our data, we find results that are, at least qualitatively, in line with their results (see table 2) in that short trade durations are associated with informed trading. Hence, the difference must be due to the empirical methodology, i.e. the way these models process the data and not the differences of trading processes in a pure limit order market and a hybrid market. In the following we will offer an explanation for the differences. A convenient way to implement a strategy that aggressively strives for price priority a'la Parlour (1998) are so-called market-to-limit orders.
As a matter of fact, this order type is a very popular and frequently used instrument. A buy market-to-limit order consumes the volume at the best ask and the volume that exceeds the depth and the best ask is entered, at the limit price, on top of the queue of the limit orders standing on the bid side. As figure 7 shows, those trades that exactly consume the volume at the best quotes (which are in the vast majority of the cases market-to-limit-orders) indeed have significantly smaller duration than trades that consume only part of the depth at the best quote. Note that in a basic MRR model framework, a market-to-limit order would be deemed uninformative while in a Hasbrouck-VAR setting the events triggered by a marketto-limit order would be regarded as highly informative. The numerical example depicted in the following table makes that point clear: While the transaction price (P ) in the sequence of events does not change at all, the midquote changes ∆M Q is dramatic.
A market-to-limit order is a perfect tool for an impatient trader to gain price priority when own side liquidity is high. However, as the market-to-limit trader also immediately supplies liquidity (during times when liquidity is already high) it is hard to ascribe such a behavior to the exploitation of superior private information. It is rather the crowding-out effect in liquid markets described by Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1998) that we observe.
In that perspective it seems more reasonable to view market-to-limit order trade events as a way to implement an aggressive trading strategy (without private information processing involved) than deem these trades as highly informative with respect to the fundamental asset 19 value.
Conclusion and Outlook
This paper provides new evidence regarding the role of time in measuring the informational content of trades. Two novelties characterize our contribution. First, instead of the vector autoregressive methodology employed by Dufour and Engle (2000), we advocate the use of a structural model and extend Madhavan et al's (1997) this paper provide quite contrasting evidence. As in the Dufour/Engle paper we also find that "time matters", both from a statistical and an economic point of view. However, our results imply that the informational content of a trade increases with the duration since the last trade. Our analysis suggests that in an automated order book market, but also in an hybrid framework like the NYSE, the role of time in measuring trade informativeness is more in accord with the predictions derived from the Admati/Pfleiderer (1988) model, and models of strategic trading in limit order markets (Parlour (1998 ), Foucault (1999 ). In these models, high trading intensity is caused by the submission of market orders by impatient yet and Realized Spread (%) report the average realized spread and the average relative realized spread. Price Impact (in euros) and Price Impact (%) report the average price impact and the average relative price impact over the 3 months sample period.. The price impact was obtained by subtracting the realized spread from the effective spread. The stocks are sorted into four groups according to their trading frequency, i.e. by the column Daily nb. trades. The horizontal lines separate the four trading activity quartiles. averaged across all stocks. The third column reports the number of significant (α = 1%) parameters. The remaining columns show the same results for the four sub-samples sorted by trading activity. For convenience, we report only the parameters capturing the duration impact and the time of day dummy.
For convenience, we report only the parameters capturing the duration impact δ 
We included five dummy variables to capture the deterministic time of day pattern. The period from 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. is the reference for both equations. Avg.
# sig
Avg.
Avg. 
denotes the average adverse selection share of the spread computed for each stock.
denotes the average adverse selection share of the spread explained by trade duration computed for each stock. dasr =
denotes the average fraction of the adverse selection component which can be explained by trade duration. Correlations were computed across the sample of the 30 stocks constituting the DAX30. P-values for the correlation coefficients are in parentheses. We denote with 'within best' the trades with a volume smaller than the best depth. With 'exact best' we denote the trades consuming exactly the best depth. Trades consuming exactly the depth up to the second, third or fourth best quote are categorized as 'exact 2/3/4' and trades with a volume higher than the best depth but within any higher order quote are denoted as 'beyond best'.
